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Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the
Act)' in an effort to eradicate specified categories of discrimination
in private employment. Following the increased political en-
franchisement of nondominant groups, the Act proclaimed an offi-
cial end to the era of second-class status for women and minorities
in the workforce.2 It promised a new era of economic and personal
opportunity to sectors of the population previously excluded. Title
VII reflected the growing notion that formal political freedom
meant little without real access to economic opportunity.3
A critical aspect of the Title VII scheme was to pressure em-
ployers by creating remedies for the victims of employment dis-
crimination. Whole classes of plaintiffs, as well as individuals,
could now seek redress in the courts, and the 'Act directed courts
to fashion equitable relief for victims of proven discrimination.4
Such relief was to remedy the harm done to the individual plain-
t B.A. 1989, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of Chicago.
1 Pub L No 88-352 § 701 et seq, 78 Stat 253 (1964), codified as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L No 92-261, 86 Stat 103 (1972), at 42 USC
§ 2000e (1988).
1 Section 703(a) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 USC § 2000e-2(a).
S Said one member of the House Judiciary Committee: "The right to vote [] does not
have much meaning on an empty stomach." Civil Rights Act of 1963, HR Rep No 914, Part
2, 88th Cong, 1st Sess 26 (1963) (additional views of Rep. McCulloch), reprinted in EEOC,
Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 2147 (GPO, 1968)
("Legislative History-1964"). Coming at the apex of the civil rights movement, Title VII
culminated a drive that began by prohibiting discrimination in government employment and
government contract employment. See id at 1-5.
" Section 706(g), 42 USC § 2000e-5(g) (quoted in text at note 65).
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tiff, and also to deter future acts of discrimination by the defend-
ant and other employers.5 Thus, the remedial side of Title VII
kept one eye on the particular needs of the victim and the other on
the phenomenon of discrimination itself.
This Comment addresses one possible remedy: "bumping."
Discrimination charges often arise after an allegedly unlawful dis-
charge, refusal to hire, or refusal to promote the plaintiff. After a
victim proves liability, a court must determine how to compensate
for the prohibited discrimination. Courts frequently order the em-
ployer to place the victim in the position she would have occupied
but for the discrimination. When the employer has already filled
the position, reinstatement6 means that the employer must
"bump" the incumbent employee to make room for the dis-
criminatee.7 Courts currently award bumping only under compel-
ling and narrow circumstances.8
Many courts do not find the mere fact of discrimination suffi-
ciently compelling to warrant immediate reinstatement. These
courts perceive bumping as redressing the employer's wrong at the
expense of an innocent third party, the incumbent. Instead, they
require the victim to wait for the next available opening. This ap-
proach, known'as the "rightful place" doctrine, can result in long
' Albemarle Paper Co. v Moody, 422 US 405, 417-18 (1975).
' This Comment uses-the term "reinstatement" as shorthand for the entire range of
court-ordered employment remedies. Technically, "reinstatement" refers to an order placing
the person in a position the person actually occupied before the act of discrimination. Thus,
it typically relates to unlawful discharges. "Instatement" refers to an order placing the per-
son in a position she would have occupied absent the discrimination. It encompasses hirings
and promotions. The remedial provision of Title VII, § 706(g), 42 USC § 2000e-5(g), allows
for court-ordered "reinstatement," "hiring of employees," and "promotions." See text at
note 65.
'The victim may not actually desire the unlawfully denied job. The victim may have
found alternative employment, or residual animosity between the victim and the employer
may discourage the victim from seeking reinstatement. A presumptive right to reinstate-
ment, however, will have important antidiscrimination consequences. First, at least some
Title VII victims will want reinstatement. Second, a presumptive reinstatement rule may
have important preference-shaping consequences for victims. That is, the current reluctance
of victims to request reinstatement may be less a function of factors such as those listed
above than of the current legal rule restricting reinstatement. Third, even if the victim does
not desire reinstatement, the entitlement to reinstatement will enhance the victim's bar-
gaining position during settlement discussions. See Section II for the argument that rein-
statement serves the text, history, and purposes of Title VII.
' See Lee v Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F2d 1104, 1112 (5th Cir 1971) (violation of
court order); Brewer v Muscle Shoals Bd. of Educ., 790 F2d 1515, 1522-24 (11th Cir 1986)
(violation of settlement agreement); Walters v City of Atlanta, 803 F2d 1135, 1148-50 (11th
Cir 1986) (defendant manifested recalcitrance and bad faith by repeated acts of discrimina-
tion). The DC Circuit may have begun a limited trend toward bumping in Lander v Lujan,
888 F2d 153 (DC Cir 1989); see text at notes 50-63.
Relief Under Title VII
delays for the discriminatee, especially when the illegally denied
position is unique.
This Comment argues that bumping should be the rule, not
the exception, for Title VII relief. Court-ordered bumping squares
with the text, history, and prophylactic purposes of Title VII far
better than alternate remedies do. Courts should minimize the in-
convenience and unfairness to bumped incumbents by tailoring the
bumping order, not by entrenching them in their jobs.
Section I examines the development of the rightful place doc-
trine. Section II argues for the appropriateness of bumping in light
of Title VII's text, history, and purposes. Finally, Section III sug-
gests an approach that gives greater scope to bumping as a remedy,
and considers how courts can alleviate the hardship to the dis-
placed incumbent.
I. THE CURRENT DOMINANCE OF RIGHTFUL PLACE RELIEF OVER
BUMPING
Title VII provides for the reinstatement of discriminatees.9
When the employer has already filled the position with another
employee, the court may either order immediate reinstatement
(displacing the incumbent), or delay reinstatement until the posi-
tion becomes vacant and order compensatory pay in the interim
(the rightful place remedy). This Section examines the develop-
ment of the latter option as the preferred remedy.
A. The Rightful Place Doctrine
Courts developed the rightful place doctrine as an appropriate
strategy in the limited context of pre-Act seniority systems, but
have indefensibly expanded it beyond this original domain. Mean-
while, bumping typically has been reserved for situations involving
employer bad faith or disregard of a court order, although one cir-
cuit court has slightly broadened its application.
1. Seniority system discrimination cases.
Supporters of Title VII made it clear that the Act's effect was
to be purely prospective, not retrospective."0 That is, discrimina-
9 Section 706(g), 42 USC § 2000e-5(g) (quoted in text at note 65).
10 110 Cong Rec 7213 (April 8, 1964) (memorandum of Senators Clark and Case), re-
printed in Legislative History-1964 at 3043 (cited in note 3) ("Clark-Case memorandum").
See Franks v Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 US 747, 759 (1976) (quoting with ap-
proval from legislative history that Title VII is "prospective and not retrospective"); see also
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tory acts or practices occurring before the effective date of the Act
could not form the basis of a Title VII violation. Yet some pre-Act
practices tended to perpetuate the effects of discrimination "after
the effective date. Insulating those practices from Title VII scru-
tiny would create an enormous barrier to progress for nondomi-
nant groups in employment. One such practice was the departmen-
tal seniority system. 1
Prior to the Act's passage, some companies divided workers
into groups or departments and assigned each department a par-
ticular task within the larger work force. Workers bid for job open-
ings on the basis of their "departmental" seniority.1 Applying for
an opening in another department meant starting at the bottom of
that department's seniority roster, because seniority in one depart-
ment did not count in another. Further, employers often strictly
segregated departments, with blacks and other minorities relegated
to the departments with less desirable, lower-paying jobs.
Title VII forbids racial exclusion by department.'" Blacks and
other previously excluded groups could now apply for openings in
any department, and employers had to evaluate their applications
under nondiscriminatory criteria. Still, the old departmental se-
niority rosters put minorities at an acute disadvantage. They had
to begin at the bottom of the formerly all-white department, even
though their plant seniority with the employer might be compara-
ble to, or exceed, those ranked significantly higher under depart-
mental seniority. Courts thus faced the dilemma of what to do with
seniority systems that, although facially nondiscriminatory, locked
in pre-Act discrimination. Congress's clear intent not to punish
pre-Act practices compounded the problem. Further, § 703(h)
Local 189, United Papermakers v United States, 416 F2d 980, 987 (5th Cir 1969) ("No one
can quarrel with the broad proposition that Title VII operates only prospectively.").
"1 The seniority system cases do not involve departmental discrimination alone. Other
seniority system issues-for example, lines of progression and layoffs-also plagued early
Title VII litigation. See, for example, Watkins v United Steelworkers, Local 2369, 516 F2d
41 (5th Cir 1975). The rightful place doctrine developed as a general response to seniority
systems. The following discussion uses the particular problem presented by departmental
seniority systems to illustrate the general problem.
12 "Seniority" is susceptible to different measurements. "Employment," "mill," or
"plant" seniority refers to total length of employment with the employer; "departmental"
seniority refers to length of service in a department; "progression line" seniority refers to
length of service in a line of progression; "job" seniority refers to length of service in a given
job. George Cooper and Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv L Rev
1598, 1602 (1969).
13 Section 703(a), 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) (quoted in note 2).
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places "bona fide seniority systems" outside the Act's ambit.14
Courts solved this dilemma by crafting the rightful place doctrine.
The Fifth Circuit was the first appellate court explicitly to ap-
prove rightful place relief. In Local 189, United Papermakers v
United States,5 the employer organized employees into lines of
progression whereby experience in each line served as training for
the next. The employer reserved some lines of progression for
whites and some for blacks. The least desirable white jobs gener-
ally paid more and delegated more responsibility than the best
black jobs. 6 Even after desegregation of the plant, blacks were at a
tremendous disadvantage in applying for formerly white jobs be-
cause they had no seniority in white lines of progression. This, the
court held, violated Title VII.'7
The court first dutifully recited the widely accepted proposi-
tion that "Title VII operates only prospectively."'" It then consid-
ered three possible remedies in departmental seniority cases.'" The
first, the "freedom now" theory, was the historical antecedent to
bumping. Under this theory, the court would purge all the effects
of past discrimination by placing blacks in the jobs they would
have occupied but for the discrimination. Blacks with greater plant
seniority would displace white incumbents. Allowing junior white
employees to keep their jobs, in this view, itself constituted an act
of discrimination. A second approach, the "status quo" theory, re-
quired only that employers stop present discrimination. Blacks
hired before Title VII would have to compete on the basis of de-
segregated departmental seniority. Thus, departments would re-
14 Congress included § 703(h) as a political compromise to ensure passage of the Act by
reassuring labor leaders and others that the Act would not affect seniority systems. See
American Tobacco Co. v Patterson, 456 US 63, 72 (1982).
" 416 F2d 980 (5th Cir 1969). A year earlier, the district court in Quarles v Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F Supp 505 (E D Va 1968), became the first federal court to adopt the
theory. Declaring that "Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro
employees into discriminatory patterns," id at 516, the Quarles court ordered the employer
to base bidding on plant seniority, not departmental seniority. Id at 521. The court dis-
missed the argument that such an arrangement would disrupt the departmental seniority
expectations of white employees, declaring those expectations to be "not vested, indefeasible
rights." Id at 520. Although the court did not adopt the rightful place doctrine by name, its
remedy self-consciously drew upon a student note outlining the contours of that theory. Id
at 510, citing Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 Harv
L Rev 1260 (1967).
16 416 F2d at 983.
.7 Id at 986, 997.
Id at 987.
15 Id at 988. The court's discussion relied heavily on Note, 80 Harv L Rev at 1268-69
(cited in note 15).
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main segregated until the work force turned over enough so that
the new, nondiscriminatory seniority system had a real effect.
The Fifth Circuit adopted a third theory, the rightful place
doctrine, as a compromise between the extremes of "freedom now"
and "status quo":
The Act should be construed to prohibit the future awarding
of vacant jobs on the basis of a seniority system that "locks
in" prior racial classification. White incumbent workers
should not be bumped out of their present positions by Ne-
groes with greater plant seniority; plant seniority should be
asserted only with respect to new job openings.2"
The court saw the rightful place doctrine as undoing the continu-
ing effects of past discrimination (thereby serving the Act's pur-
poses) without undoing past discrimination itself (by not removing
junior white incumbents hired before the Act in favor of blacks
with more plant seniority). In this way the court could fulfill the
Act's antidiscrimination directive without applying Title VII retro-
spectively. The result was a seniority system remedy plausibly con-
sistent with Title VII's language, history, and purposes.
In the seven years after Local 189, other circuits eagerly
adopted the rightful place doctrine.21 Importantly, each of these
courts applied the doctrine in situations that shared two key char-
acteristics: plaintiffs claimed relief from seniority systems, the dis-
criminatory characteristics of which pre-dated the Act.2 As will be
seen, both of these characteristics clearly distinguish the early
rightful-place cases from ones in which a victim proves post-Act,
non-seniority system discrimination. 3
20 416 F2d at 988 (emphasis in original).
2 See EEOC v Detroit Edison Co., 515 F2d 301, 316 (6th Cir 1975); Gamble v Birming-
ham Southern R.R. Co., 514 F2d 678, 683 (5th Cir 1975); United States v N.L. Industries,
479 F2d 354, 374-75 (8th Cir 1973); United States v Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 471 F2d
582, 587-89 (4th Cir 1972); United States v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F2d 652, 661 (2d Cir
1971).
22 The seniority system at issue in Bethlehem Steel continued to discriminate two years
after the effective date of Title VII. 446 F2d at 658. Still, the court emphasized the impor-
tance of its decision not to "freeze" in pre-Act discriminatory patterns. Id at 661-62 (citing
Quarles, 279 F Supp at 516).
2 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324 (1977), the
Supreme Court overruled the line of cases beginning with Quarles and Local 189. The Court
ruled that § 703(h) protects seniority systems even if they tend to perpetuate the effects of
pre-Act discrimination, as long as they were not designed to discriminate. Teamsters does
not alter the analysis here, however, that courts developed the rightful place doctrine as a
response to a limited problem.
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The Fourth Circuit expanded the application of the rightful
place doctrine to include post-Act seniority system discrimination
in Patterson v American Tobacco Co. 4 The court explicitly con-
sidered-but refused to permit-the bumping of junior employees
hired after the effective date of Title VII.25 The court first relied
on an interpretive memorandum by Senators Clark and Case, co-
sponsors of Title VII, to support its view that Congress did not
intend to authorize courts to bump incumbents." Second, the
court described bumping as an "unsettling process" that would re-
quire judges periodically to rearrange the lives and businesses of
incumbents and employers. Finally, the court contended that
rightful place relief was indeed complete relief for victims, because
they could receive compensatory pay until the employer actually
promoted them.2" Thus, after Patterson, victims of post-Act dis-
crimination were limited to the same relief as victims of pre-Act
discrimination, despite the absence of the retrospectivity concern.29
From Local 189 to Patterson, then, courts applied the rightful
place doctrine to seniority system cases. If the courts had contin-
ued to apply the doctrine merely to seniority system litigation, its
importance in the debate over Title VII remedies would have di-
minished over time, because it would have applied only to individ-
uals who accumulated seniority rights and job positions prior to
1964.30 The inevitable decline of Title VII claims based on discrim-
ination in seniority systems would have caused the doctrine to die
a quiet death, without the need to consider whether the doctrine
was consistent with Title VII as an initial matter. But since the
late 1970s, courts have breathed new life into the doctrine by ap-
plying it well beyond its original domain.
24 535 F2d 257 (4th Cir 1976).
'" Patterson was the first decision in which a court extensively considered bumping as a
possible alternative to the rightful place doctrine.
"' The court's interpretation of this memorandum is questionable. See Section II.B.2.
for discussion of the relevant legislative history cited in Patterson.
27 535 F2d at 268.
's Id at 269.
19 In American Tobacco Co. v Patterson, the Supreme Court effectively abolished the
distinction between pre- and post-Act seniority systems. 456 US at 68. The Court's decision,
however, does not affect the analysis here. The rightful place doctrine developed as a re-
sponse to the perceived need for an approach that balanced the Act's remedial purposes and
its nonretrospective character. The Court did not address the propriety of the rightful place
doctrine in American Tobacco.
' See Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation,
Legislation, and Organization, 38 Cath U L Rev 795, 810 (1989).
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2. Application beyond seniority system cases.
After Patterson, the rightful place doctrine took hold as the
generally accepted mechanism for Title VII relief. Courts applied
the doctrine reflexively, not considering whether the original ra-
tionale for its use fit changing circumstances.
Harper v General Grocers Co."1 was an early such extension.
Superficially, Harper involved a dispute over seniority rights. The
employer had advanced employees from temporary, "casual" sta-
tus to regular, permanent status on the basis of seniority. Just
before Harper was due to advance from the former category to the
latter, the employer discharged him. Shortly thereafter, the em-
ployer advanced to permanent employment the employee who had
been behind Harper on the casual list.3 2 Thus, the dispute over
seniority rights really involved the wrongful denial of a single posi-
tion to a single individual,33 rather than the systematic denial of
advancement to a class of plaintiffs as in the previous seniority
system cases.
The Eighth Circuit rejected Harper's request for immediate
reinstatement because another employee already held the position
he sought. The court characterized the choice as one between the
"legitimate expectations of nonvictim employees" and the restora-
tion of the victim to his "rightful place. '8 4 While the court noted
that reinstatement would have afforded Harper "the most com-
plete relief," it found the district court's refusal to so order not to
be an abuse of discretion. 5 The Harper court did not mention the
district court's novel application of the rightful place doctrine to
the one-on-one discrimination context.3
In Spagnuolo v Whirlpool Corp.,7 the Fourth Circuit pressed
the rightful place doctrine beyond all previous bounds. The court
determined that rightful place relief was compelled by "the con-
31 590 F2d 713 (8th Cir 1979).
32 Id at 715-16.
13 This is known as "one-on-one" discrimination.
3, 590 F2d at 716. See also Vaughn v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F Supp 281, 291
(E D Ark 1979) (rightful place relief awarded out of concern that bumping displaces "inno-
cent employees").
35 590 F2d at 716-17. This Comment argues that reviewing courts should find such re-
fusal to be an abuse of discretion. See note 101.
316 The court cited as support two rightful place cases involving seniority system litiga-
tion. Id at 717 (citing Gamble, 514 F2d 683, and Reed v Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F2d 721,
726 (8th Cir 1973)).
"1 717 F2d 114 (4th Cir 1983). Spagnuolo was brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 USC § 621 et seq (1988), but the court applied the principles
of Title VII. Id at 119-20.
[58:703
Relief Under Title VII
gressional process by which Title VII was enacted."38 The
Spagnuolo court took Patterson's reading of legislative history as a
matter of faith-neglecting even to cite the critical interpretive
memo by Senators Clark and Case-and thereby extended the al-
ready overbroad interpretation.
Spagnuolo completed the transformation of the rightful place
theory from a limited doctrine applicable only in a narrow category
of cases implicating pre-Act seniority system discrimination to
"the generally appropriate mechanism for injunctive relief under
Title VII." 9 The rightful place doctrine now stood squarely be-
tween the victims of discrimination and their rightful places.
B. Bumping in the Federal Courts
Despite the reign of the rightful place doctrine in Title VII
cases, courts on occasion have considered displacing incumbents in
favor of proven victims of discrimination. The Supreme Court has
discussed in dicta the relative merits of rightful place and bumping
relief in Title VII cases. In Firefighters Local Union v Stotts, 40 a
seniority system case, the Court noted that a victim of
discrimination
is not automatically entitled to have a nonminority employee
laid off to make room for him. He may have to wait until a
vacancy occurs, and if there are nonminority employees on
layoff, the court must balance the equities in determining who
is entitled to the job.41
That a victim is "not automatically entitled" to incumbent dis-
placement indicates that under some circumstances the victim may
be entitled to such relief. The Court also noted, however, that the
lower courts had "uniformly" denied bumping relief for actual vic-
tims. 42 Bumping would be inappropriate "absent either a finding
that the seniority system was adopted with discriminatory intent
"8 Id at 121.
" Id at 120. The facts of Spagnuolo demonstrate the extent of the hesitation to award
bumping. It had been 30 months since the rightful place order was issued, and over 15
months since the court-issued stay expired. Yet the court prohibited the district court from
ordering Whirlpool to bump the incumbent "regardless of the passage of time." Id at 121.
The circuit court did permit bumping, however, of the individual whom the employer placed
in the next-available position after a rightful place order already had been entered on the
victim's behalf. Id at 122.
40 467 US 561 (1984).
"1 Id at 579 (footnote omitted).
41 Id at 579 n 11 (citing Patterson and Local 189). The Supreme Court carefully limits
make-whole relief to "actual victims" of discrimination. Firefighters, 467 US at 580.
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or a determination that such a remedy was necessary to make
whole a proven victim of discrimination."4 The two passages are
equivocal, and dicta at that. The lower courts, however, have con-
sidered the issue several times on the merits.
Lower courts have ordered bumping only rarely, when they
identify interests regarded as more fundamental than the incum-
bent's interest in keeping his job. Most courts that have ordered
bumping emphasize their desire to protect the institutional role of
the courts in fashioning relief. For instance, bumping is awarded
routinely after the employer has violated a prior court order to
cease discriminating.4
4
The Eleventh Circuit ordered bumping in Walters v City of
Atlanta,45 based on the court's interest in discouraging recalci-
trance and bad faith. The court relied on a non-exhaustive, non-
controlling list of factors. 46 It noted first that the defendant had
engaged in repeated acts of discrimination against Walters; second,
that the defendant had exhibited "recalcitrance" by its subsequent
retaliatory acts against Walters; third, that the position denied the
plaintiff was unique; and finally, that the defendant could mini-
mize the harm to the bumped incumbent by offering alternative
employment. The court also emphasized in a footnote that the in-
cumbent "was at least on inquiry notice, if not actually aware, of
the controversy surrounding the directorship and Walters' claims
to it when she was hired. ' 47 Thus, the court achieved its pro-
bumping result in part by rejecting the usual presumption that
bumped incumbents are "innocent." The court offered no guidance
as to the type of facts sufficient to put an incumbent on inquiry
13 Id at 576 n 9.
"' See, for example, Lee, 453 F2d at 1112 (arguing that the fact that another occupied
the plaintiff's denied position "obviously cannot prevent appropriate relief by a court of
equity in vindication of the law and the Constitution" after the defendant violated a court
order to desegregate). Although not a Title VII case, Lee guided subsequent courts con-
fronting similar issues. See also Brewer, 790 F2d at 1522-23 (arguing that Congress's desire
to enforce Title VII through voluntary settlement justified bumping after the defendant
violated a settlement agreement); Sebastian v Texas Dept. of Corrections, 541 F Supp 970,
978 (S D Tex 1982) (awarding preliminary injunction instating plaintiff even if employer
must bump incumbent); McCurdy v School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 367 F Supp 747, 752
(S D Fla 1973) (bumping issued as part of preliminary injunction, and school system or-
dered to offer the bumped incumbent principal the first available principal's job and to
maintain his pay rate).
" 803 F2d 1135, 1149-50 (11th Cir 1986).
46 Id at 1150 & n 15.
"1 Id at 1150 n 15. Earlier in its opinion, the court noted that the employer was on
notice that there was a substantial Title VII claim to the vacant position. Id at 1149 n 12.
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notice that another lays claim to the same job.4"
Perhaps more important than the Walters enumeration of fac-
tors that justified bumping (and its implicit rejection of the ex-
panded version of the rightful place doctrine) is its subtle recon-
ceptualization of the interests at stake. Prior to Walters, courts
usually perceived bumping as a penalty unfairly visited upon an
incumbent. The Walters court turned that conception on its head:
To not allow the "bumping" of a direct beneficiary of re-
peated discrimination by the direct victim of the same acts of
discrimination would penalize the plaintiff who won his suit
but lost the race to fill the position he had been unlawfully
denied.49
Before Walters, courts characterized bumping as penalizing the in-
cumbent employee; after Walters, courts may see failing to bump
as penalizing the victim.
Only one circuit has found the requisite compelling interest in
the victim's Title VII rights alone. In Lander v Lujan,50 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit became the first court consciously to re-
ject the rightful place doctrine in cases of one-on-one discrimina-
tion. Lander's employer essentially had demoted him from his top-
level administrative position in retaliation for Lander's criticism of
the employer's affirmative action plan.5 ' The demotion violated
§ 704(a), which prohibits discriminating against an employee "be-
cause he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by" Title VII.52 The district court had ordered the em-
ployer to reinstate Lander in the more senior position because "ab-
sent 'bumping' the plaintiff's relief would be unjustly
inadequate." 53
The appellate court determined that the relief ordered by the
district court accorded with Title ViI's make-whole, policy. It
found "no evidence that Congress intended to exclude bumping
from the district court's arsenal of available alternatives. ' 54 Judge
Silberman's opinion for the majority turned for guidance to reme-
dies available under counterpart sections of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), upon which § 706(g) was "'expressly
48 Id at 1150 n 15.
"I Id at 1149 (emphasis added).
80 888 F2d 153 (DC Cir 1989).
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modeled.' "5 Under the NLRA, the court observed, bumping is a
"commonplace remedy." 6 In the court's view, this fact evinced a
congressional intent to include bumping among the remedies avail-
able in Title VII. The court also noted that the EEOC had adopted
bumping as an appropriate remedy for discrimination. 57
In balancing the equities between the incumbent and the vic-
tim, the court concluded that neither the statute nor logic gave the
former a "superior equitable claim to the job. '58 Moreover, the em-
ployer's interest in not having the workplace disrupted could not
trump the victim's right to complete relief. As the court noted,
"the employer's intentional discrimination created the disturbance
by harming the plaintiff." 59
The Lander court's endorsement of bumping is broad, but not
unqualified.60 The court carefully limited its holding to allow
bumping only in disparate treatment cases, where discrimination is
explicitly intended.6 1 Lander also involved the demotion of the vic-
tim; a victim's claim to immediate reinstatement to his rightful po-
sition may be greater in demotion cases than in hiring and firing
cases, which form the bulk of Title VII litigation. Similarly, the
court took special note that the "impact of bumping on the inno-
cent incumbent [was] relatively mild";62 one is left to wonder
about the result if the impact had been more severe. Finally, the
court implied that bumping might not be appropriate when vacan-
cies appear frequently.6 3 Nevertheless, the court jettisoned the re-
quirement that a court find "recalcitrance" or other bad faith be-
havior by the defendant before entering a bumping order.6 4 No
other circuit has yet followed suit.
55 Id (quoting Albemarle Paper, 422 US at 419 & n 11). The NLRA is codified at 29
USC § 151 et seq (1988).
56 888 F2d at 156.
51 Id at 157 & n 4 (citing 29 CFR § 1613.271(a)(3)).
58 Id at 157.
89 Id at 158.
60 See Jones v Rivers, 732 F Supp 176 (D DC 1990) (citing Lander, court awarded
bumping when position sought was unique); EEOC v District of Columbia, Dept. of Human
Services, 729 F Supp 907 (D DC 1990) (ADEA case, declining to award bumping when open-
ings were frequent).
"' 888 F2d at 157. The Lander court thus declined to review the possibility of a bump-
ing order in disparate impact cases. Disparate impact cases do not require a showing of
intentional discrimination, but merely proof that a rule or practice disadvantages protected
groups. See Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US 424 (1971).
62 888 F2d at 156.
83 Id at 158.
64 Id at 156.
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II. THE PROPRIETY OF BUMPING RELIEF UNDER TITLE VII
A court confronts two remedial alternatives when fashioning
relief for the victim of discrimination: order the victim to await the
next available vacancy for the illegally denied spot (rightful place),
or order immediate placement of the victim in that position
(bumping). Having examined the dramatic expansion of the right-
ful place doctrine as the preferred remedy, this Comment now ad-
dresses the propriety of bumping in the context of Title VII.
The analysis below suggests that bumping better comports
with the text, history, and purposes of the Act. The traditional ap-
proach to bumping as a simple confrontation between the victim
and the innocent incumbent must be reconsidered. Instead, the
employer's act of discrimination should be viewed as a harm vis-
ited upon both the victim and the incumbent, requiring a vigorous
response from courts. Treating displacement merely as a contest
between two innocent actors, without considering the behavior that
put them in jeopardy, is unhelpful and paralyzes equitable judg-
ment. The Solomonic dilemma envisioned by the rightful place
doctrine conjures no self-evident solution. It provides no grounds
for choosing between the victim and the incumbent. Yet closer
analysis offers Title VII grounds for making that choice, and sug-
gests that the choice itself may be unnecessary.
A. The Text of Title VII
The remedial section of Title VII, § 706(g), provides that upon
a finding of liability for intentional discrimination,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative ac-
tion as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not lim-
ited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay. . ., or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.... No order of the court shall require .. . the
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an em-
ployee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such indi-
vidual . . . was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimina-
tion on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
or in violation of [§ 704(a)].15
65 42 USC § 2000e-5(g). Section 704(a) makes it unlawful to discriminate against an
employee because the employee "has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice" by Title VII, or because the employee has assisted an investigation into possible
Title VII violations. 42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
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Section 706(g) thus explicitly authorizes the gamut of affirmative
relief that would put the victim in the place she would have occu-
pied but for the discrimination: reinstatement, hiring, and promo-
tion. The importance of reinstatement-and its companion,
backpay-is highlighted by its specific delineation; the text of
§ 706(g) thus intimates that reinstatement should be a Title VII
remedy of first resort.66
Some might argue that the rightful place doctrine also fits this
textual preference for reinstatement. Section 706(g), one could ar-
gue, does not direct a court to order "immediate" reinstatement.
The salient difference between a bumping remedy and a rightful
place remedy is not substance but timing. Thus, accounting for
textual ambiguity on the timing of the relief order, the rightful
place remedy could be thought to fulfill the text's promise of
reinstatement.
For two reasons, however, the text points away from a delayed
application of reinstatement. First, the opening sentence of
§ 706(g) has a parallel construction that authorizes injunctive re-
lief (ordering the employer to cease discriminating) as well as af-
firmative relief. Few would argue that the mere absence of a timing
specification in the first part (that is, an "immediately" before the
words "enjoin the respondent") allows a court to delay application
of the remedy once it finds liability. The unstated premise is that
the injunctive relief will swiftly follow upon the liability determi-
nation. Similarly, the absence of a timing specification in the sec-
ond part of the sentence should not, by itself, counsel delayed ap-
plication of affirmative relief.
Second, § 706(g) contemplates reinstatement with backpay.
Backpay compensates the victim for pecuniary loss suffered be-
tween the time of the discrimination and the time the court finds
liability.61 Backpay does not compensate the victim for pecuniary
loss suffered after the finding of liability ("frontpay"). The fact
that the text links reinstatement with backpay, not frontpay, indi-
cates a preference for immediate reinstatement. Otherwise, the vic-
tim would not enjoy affirmative relief between the date of judg-
ment and any delayed reinstatement. Needless to say, a court
could order backpay, frontpay, and delayed reinstatement-the
classic formulation of the rightful place remedy-consistent with
66 See, for example, Darnell v City of Jasper, 730 F2d 653, 655 (11th Cir 1984).
6' Backpay for discrimination occurring more than two years prior to the filing of a
charge, however, is not authorized. See § 706(g), 42 USC § 2000e-5(g).
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the text of § 706(g). But the close textual link between reinstate-
ment and backpay slants resolution of the timing question in favor
of immediate reinstatement.
Section 706(g), of course, does not explicitly authorize a court
to order bumping. Some might suggest, therefore, that reinstate-
ment is authorized only when no incumbent will suffer. Several
strong textual reasons exist to doubt this construction of § 706(g).
First, § 706(g) is simply silent on bumping. Cases involving bump-
ing are a subset of reinstatement cases, which the text does men-
tion. Conceptually, reinstatement involves the potential for incum-
bent displacement. Rather than specify each context in which a
court may or may not order reinstatement, the statutory language
grants authority to order reinstatement across a broad spectrum of
contexts. Given the unqualified language authorizing reinstate-
ment, the presumption should favor granting reinstatement in all
cases, including bumping cases, rather than limiting the reinstate-
ment remedy to narrow categories.
Second, Title VII elsewhere protects incumbents' vested inter-
ests in their jobs. Section 703(h) shields from court scrutiny the
positions of incumbents hired pursuant to a "bona fide seniority
system. '68 If incumbent interests necessarily trump the textual
preference for reinstatement, why does § 706(g) not mention that
fact? That the Act explicitly protects incumbents in some circum-
stances, such as the seniority system context, suggests that it does
not afford the same protection where it does not do so explicitly.
Congress could anticipate that the investigation and litigation
stages of discrimination cases would last months or even years, and
Congress must have known that employers could not afford to
keep the disputed positions vacant until resolution of the contro-
versy. If the foreseeable problem of the incumbent weighed heavily
on the legislators' minds, Congress easily could have added an ex-
emption from the reinstatement remedy for incumbents, just as it
did for non-discriminatory behavior. Yet the text is silent on the
issue.
Finally, § 706(g) is directed at courts, not employers. In reme-
dying discrimination, the court does no more than order reinstate-
ment to the discriminatorily denied position. What the employer
does to make that position available to the victim-whether bump-
ing the incumbent or creating an equivalent position-is the em-
ployer's concern. On this view, the court does not order bumping
" 42 USC § 2000e-2(h).
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at all. It orders reinstatement. Such an order perfectly fits within
the parameters of § 706(g). Of course, the balance of equities may
caution against displacing an incumbent, and a court will rightly
take that fact into account when ordering immediate reinstate-
ment,69 but the text does not preclude such an order.
Thus, the language of § 706(g) is permissive, neither requiring
nor prohibiting bumping. Bumping is at least consistent with the
text and perhaps favored by it. The legislative history helps dis-
cern the congressional intent behind the text.70
B. The Legislative History of Title VII
Congress did not consider bumping or rightful place relief ex-
plicitly during its debates on Title VII.71 The three considerations
presented in this subsection, however, drawn from the legislative
history of Title VII, suggest that Congress wanted to imbue
§ 706(g) with a scope broad enough to include bumping as a
remedy.
1. Congress's general aspirations in drafting § 706(g).
Congress wanted Title VII remedies to reconstruct the em-
ployment circumstances that would exist in a nondiscriminatory
world. The drafters of the 1972 amendment to § 706(g) 72 made it
clear that they shared the courts' understanding that Title VII re-
lief should make victims whole:
[T]he courts have stressed that ... [§ 706(g)] is intended to
make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that
the attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimi-
nation of the particular unlawful employment practice com-
plained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the
consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice
e See Section III.A. for an argument that the equities favor displacement.
70 In construing Title VII, the Supreme Court looks first to the text and then to the
legislative history of the law. See, for example, American Tobacco, 456 US at 68.
71 Congress's discussion of reinstatement largely recited § 706(g) without elaboration.
To illustrate: "The relief available [under the Act] is a court order ... directing the offender
to take appropriate affirmative action; for example, reinstating or hiring employees, with or
without back pay." 110 Cong Rec 11848 (May 25, 1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey),
reprinted in Legislative History-1964 at 3259 (cited in note 3).
71 The amendment broadened the courts' authority to fashion make-whole relief by ad-
ding the phrases "but is not limited to" and "or any other" to this section (quoted in text at
note 65).
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be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would
have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.73
The Section-By-Section analysis of the bill stated that a broad
reading of effective remedies was needed "to effectively combat the
presence of employment discrimination. ' 74 The congressional de-
sire to eliminate the "consequences and effects" of employment
discrimination argues in favor of reinstatement under even un-
pleasant circumstances. The passage indicates that the judicial cre-
ation of a nondiscriminatory world is limited only by what is "pos-
sible." Surely a court order immediately reinstating a
discriminatee falls in that category.
Congress knew of the nonpecuniary values attached to em-
ployment when it enacted Title VII. That helps explain the inclu-
sion of reinstatement among the available remedies. Congress did
not choose to add a caveat to Title VII barring reinstatement if the
remedy required displacement. Further, the fate of incumbents
certainly entered the legislators' deliberations on Title VII. Con-
gress debated at length the effect of Title VII on seniority rights.
They settled on a compromise that protected incumbents' interests
in seniority systems. 5
2. The National Labor Relations Act.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects the rights
of workers to organize unions 'and to bargain collectively.7 It pro-
hibits employers from discriminating against employees on the ba-
sis of union activity.77 Title VII echoes the NLRA's willingness to
circumscribe the traditional power of employers to organize the
workplace as they see fit.
Congress expressly intended to model remedies available in
Title VII after NLRA remedies. 78 Thus, it is no accident that the
71 118 Cong Rec 7168 (Mar 6, 1972) (Section-By-Section Analysis of HR 1746, accom-
panying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972), reprinted in Legislative History
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 1848 (GPO, 1972) ("Legislative
History-1972").
74 118 Cong Rec 4942 (Feb 22, 1972), reprinted in Legislative History-1972 at 1771
(cited in note 73).
71 Section 703(h), 42 USC § 2000e-2(h); see American Tobacco, 456 US at 72.
7' Pub L No 74-198, 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended by the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, Pub L No 80-101, 61 Stat 136 (1947), at 29 USC § 151 et seq (1988).
The rights to organize and to bargain collectively are found in NLRA § 7, 29 USC § 157.
7 NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 USC § 158(a)(3).
7' Albemarle Paper, 422 US at 419 & n 11. See also Clark-Case memorandum (cited in
note 10). Congress alsomodeled the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission after the
National Labor Relations Board. Equal Opportunity Act of 1962, HR Rep No 1370, 87th
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language of § 706(g) is virtually indistinguishable from NLRA §
10(c), which authorizes "affirmative action including reinstatement
with or without back pay."'79 As in Title VII cases, the victim of a
prohibited employment practice under the NLRA has a presump-
tive right to reinstatement."s Cases decided under the NLRA rou-
tinely award the reinstatement of victims that results in bumping
incumbents.8l The familiar remedial experience with bumping
under the NLRA therefore strongly suggests Congress intended the
same relief in Title VII cases.8 2
3. The Clark-Case memorandum.
Advocates of the rightful place doctrine as an alternative to
bumping often cite legislative history as foreclosing displacement.
The Patterson court, for example, relied on legislative history to
support its no-bumping rule. One of the "concessions" necessary
for passage of Title VII, wrote the court, was "the unequivocal as-
sertion by proponents of the legislation that it was not intended to
be used to displace incumbent workers.
8 3
In support of its broad reading of the legislative history, the
Patterson court quoted from an interpretive memorandum by Sen-
ators Clark and Case, co-managers of the bill. 4 In a footnote, the
court quoted only the italicized portion in this passage:
Cong, 2d Sess 19 (1962) (minority views of Representative Hiestand), reprinted in Legisla-
tive History-1964 at 2173 (cited in note 3).
71 29 USC § 160(c).
80 Note, Title VII Remedies: Reinstatement and the Innocent Incumbent Employee,
42 Vand L Rev 1441, 1459 (1989).
81 Lander, 888 F2d at 156. See, for example, Mastro Plastics Corp. v NLRB, 350 US
270, 278 (1956) (strikers); Radio Officers' Union v NLRB, 347 US 17, 54 (1954) (ordinary
discriminatees).
82 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that courts may have greater power to fashion
relief under Title VII than under the NLRA. Franks, 424 US at 769 n 29. Note that one
circuit judge has questioned the applicability of NLRA bumping relief to Title VII cases.
Lander, 888 F2d at 159 (R.B. Ginsburg concurring) (strike replacement workers more likely
to know of dispute over position than Title VII incumbents).
83 535 F2d at 268. The Patterson court was not the first authority to contend that Con-
gress intended to rule out bumping as a remedy. See Note, 80 Harv L Rev at 1274 (cited in
note 15) (deeming it "unlikely" that Congress intended bumping "in any circumstances");
William B. Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 Howard L J 1, 8-9 (1967) (Title VII "at odds" with bumping,
especially where discrimination antedates the effective date of the Act). These authorities
rely on legislative history like the Clark-Case memorandum that, at most, derogates the use-
of bumping in seniority system cases arising from pre-Act discriminatory practices. The
cited legislative history hardly supports the view that Congress barred bumping "in any
circumstances."
0' The Supreme Court has recognized the "authoritative nature" of the Clark-Case
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Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights.
Its effect is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for exam-
ple, if a business has been discriminating in the past and as a
result has an all-white working force, when the title comes
into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill
future vacancies on a non-discriminatory basis. He would not
be obliged--or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to
hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or,
once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights
at the expense of white workers hired earlier.5
As the context indicates, Clark and Case wrote their comment
on bumping in their discussion of seniority systems. The no-bump-
ing rule, then, seems applicable only in the narrow category of
cases dealing with seniority systems-not, as the court's statement
and selective excerpt suggest, in all cases. Although this interpreta-
tion would not alter the result in Patterson itself (because it dealt
with seniority system discrimination), it refutes the subsequent ex-
tension of the rightful place doctrine to non-seniority system dis-
crimination cases. Further, the full quotation supports the view
that Congress intended to shield only pre-Act seniority system dis-
crimination from the bumping remedy. 6 The authors emphasized
that the new law "would have no effect on established seniority
rights."
The celebrated memorandum disfavors only the bumping of
senior white employees in order to make room for junior minorities
in seniority system cases. Moreover, the memorandum supports
preserving only pre-Act seniority rights. If relevant at all, the
Clark-Case memorandum fortifies the view that Congress did not
intend to prevent bumping generally.
C. The Purposes of Title VII
A court should determine the appropriateness of a proposed
memorandum. See Firefighters, 467 US at 581 n 14. Nevertheless, two scholars have seri-
ously challenged the memorandum's interpretation of Title VII. Cooper and Sobol, 82 Harv
L Rev at 1611-14 (cited in note 12).
85 535 F2d at 268 n 7 (quoting Clark-Case memorandum (cited in note 10)).
86 See also 110 Cong Rec 7207 (Apr 8, 1964) (statement of Justice Department prepared
at the request of and placed in record by Senator Clark): "[I]t has been asserted that Title
VII would undermine vested rights of seniority. This is not correct. Title VII would have no
effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect." (quoted in Franks, 424 US at
759-60 (emphasis added)). Note, though, that the Supreme Court equated pre-Act and post-
Act seniority systems in American Tobacco. See note 29.
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remedy in light of the purposes of the Act.8 7 The Supreme Court
has identified two primary goals in the remedial provisions of Title
VII: deterring future acts of discrimination and providing make-
whole relief to the victim. 8 This subsection argues that, in most
cases, the best way to support these purposes is to reinstate the
victim to the position she would have occupied absent the discrim-
inatory acts, even if the reinstatement will cause the displacement
of an innocent incumbent.
1. Deterrence.
A fundamental goal of the Act is to deter future acts of dis-
crimination by all employers, not just the defendant. Under the
deterrence theory, relief should provide a "spur or catalyst which
causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, as far as
possible, the last vestiges" of prohibited discrimination from the
workplace."9 An award merely of backpay and/or frontpay rein-
forces the impression that employers can purchase discrimination
rights in the courts by "buying off" the plaintiff. Courts should not
enable employers to circumvent Title VII by substituting money
damages for reinstatement.9 Failure to award reinstatement, even
when an incumbent must be displaced, will not encourage the criti-
cal self-examination of employer conduct so important to Title
VII.
Bumping, on the other hand, enhances the deterrence ration-
ale of Title VII remedies. First, it demonstrates to the employer
that it will gain nothing by discrimination. After the suit, the vic-
tim will occupy the exact position the employer sought to deny
her. An award of backpay and frontpay, even coupled with rightful
place relief, permits the employer to continue to deny-or at least
to delay significantly-the resumption of the job by the victim.
The employer's basic discriminatory choice has been allowed to
stand, even if the employer suffers the out-of-pocket expenses of
court costs and compensatory pay. Some employers may be willing
to pay these costs in order to satisfy their discriminatory desire to
oust the victim. Bumping ensures that the employer will have al-
'7 Alvemarle Paper, 422 US at 417.
88 Id at 417-18.
89 Id (quoting N.L. Industries, 479 F2d at 379). See also Walsdorf v Board of Commis-
sioners, 857 F2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir 1988).
"I See Brewer, 790 F2d at 1523 n 9, adopting the rationale of Banks v Burkich 788 F2d
1161, 1164 (6th Cir 1986) (bumping remedy to vindicate First Amendment rights).
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most nothing to show for its effort except added costs; it seeks to
remedy the discrimination itself, not just the resulting economic
harm. That fact can only add to the deterrence value of the relief.
Second, the failure to order bumping allows employers to
avoid a reinstatement order by quickly hiring another employee to
fill the wrongfully denied position.9 1 It encourages strategic behav-
ior by employers to subvert the fundamental purposes of Title VII.
Third, bumping adds to the discriminating employer's cost of
doing business. The employer loses the benefit of the incumbent's
acquired experience, plus any resources the employer devoted to
training that employee. The newly instated victim will need time
to adjust to the position, adding to the employer's training costs
and reintroducing initial efficiency losses.9 2 Employer administra-
tive costs also add to expenditures. These increased costs make the
discriminating employer less efficient and competitive relative to
nondiscriminating employers. Because discriminatory conduct is
avoidable, the employer might alter its practices in order to pre-
serve the vitality of its ongoing business."
Fourth, victims might be more inclined to instigate legal ac-
tion against employers under a pro-bumping regime. Victims may
feel that compensatory pay, especially in light of the long legal bat-
tle necessary to get it, does not justify the effort required to win a
Title VII suit. The prospect of reinstatement immediately upon es-
tablishing liability might add to the ex ante likelihood that victims
will challenge the employer's behavior. More challenges to discrim-
inatory behavior will add to 'the enforcement of Title VII, making
it more likely that discriminatory conduct will be discovered and
remedied. An increase in the likelihood that courts will uncover
and penalize violations should lower the number of transgressions
ex ante.
Finally, employers will have to shoulder the burden associated
with remedies available to the bumped employee. These remedies
" See Banks, 788 F2d at 1165; Lander, 888 F2d at 159 (R.B. Ginsburg concurring).
" In cases where the court reinstates a victim to a position she previously held, these
costs will be lower. Yet even in these cases, some efficiency losses will occur, depending on
changes in procedure, technology, the amount of time required for resolution of the litiga-
tion, and similar factors.
93 See John J. Donahue HI, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U Pa L Rev 1411 (1986); Rich-
ard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U Pa L Rev 513 (1987); John J.
Donahue HI, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination: A Reply to Judge Posner,
136 U Pa L Rev 523 (1987). Both commentators agree that Title VII will tend to drive
discrimination from the market, although Judge Posner argues that the change will occur
too quickly to be efficient.
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might include compensatory pay to the incumbent and an award
for damages.94
Deterring future discrimination through bumping admittedly
will disrupt the workplace. Working relationships will be severed,
retraining will be necessary, lives will be rearranged.95 The em-
ployer undoubtedly would prefer to preserve the settled expecta-
tions arising from the status quo. But as the Lander court noted,
the employer's preferences cannot determine the remedies for Title
VII victims. 9 In short, the employer caused the "disruption." Per-
haps more fundamentally, workplace disruption adds to the deter-
rence'value of the relief. Title VII was intended precisely to "dis-
rupt" the discriminatory workplace.
2. Make-whole relief.
The second purpose of Title VII's remedial provision is to
place the victim in the position she would have occupied absent
the discrimination-to make the victim whole.97 Immediate rein-
statement is the sole remedy that, together with backpay, can
make amends for the wrongs done the victim. It alone puts her in
the position she would have occupied-to the extent the court can
divine that position from the facts before it-absent the
discrimination. 98
No other remedy is consistent with the fundamental make-
whole purpose of Title VII. The Supreme Court has directed dis-
trict courts to "fashion the most complete relief possible" in cases
of Title VII violations.99 Delayed reinstatement-reinstatement at
the next available opening-is'not the most complete relief possi-
ble. When the denied position is an upper-level management or
other supervisory job, for example, openings may be scarce. This
requires the victim to wait, denying her the position from which
she was unjustly and illegally excluded. The job may also have re-
quired specific or rare skills, 100 for which there really is only one
" For a discussion of possible relief for the displaced incumbent, see Section III.C.
" Patterson, 535 F2d at 268.
96 888 F2d at 158.
97 Teamsters, 431 US at 372 (citing Franks, 424 US at 769).
98 Of course, not even immediate reinstatement can completely undo the wrongs
wrought by prejudice. Reinstatement cannot compensate the victim adequately for the hu-
miliation and shame of being subjected to race or gender prejudice, for the delays suffered
in the courts, or for the actual time the victim missed in the job. But immediate reinstate-
ment goes much further toward that end than a court order that says, in effect, wait until
the discriminating employer has a vacancy.
91 Franks, 424 US at 764.
'10 See Walters, 803 F2d 1135.
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available position. Using the rightful place doctrine in such cir-
cumstances effectively means that the victim will never obtain the
job. Even where the disputed position is common, or opens up fre-
quently, every moment of delay is one moment short of granting
the victim "the most complete relief possible."''1
Offering the victim frontpay and backpay while she waits for
the elusive job opening does not by itself compensate her com-
pletely for the loss of the position. While frontpay and backpay are
critical to make-whole relief-they at least prevent the victim from
having to shoulder the financial strains caused by the employer's
behavior-they do not substitute for the nonpecuniary losses the
victim suffers. 102 "Salary is not the only apogee in our hierarchy of
values."'10 3 Responsibility, experience, and training are also among
the rewards for which the discriminatee applied and that the em-
ployer wrongfully denied. Especially when the job requires special
skills or is supervisory, the denial of reinstatement cheats the vic-
tim of these rewards. Requiring her to wait for a vacancy also sets
her further back in experience, which may retard her future pros-
pects for subsequent promotions and professional growth, and
compound the effects of the original discrimination.
III. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH COURTS SHOULD
ORDER BUMPING
Given the presumption in favor of bumping, this Section ex-
amines circumstances where equitable considerations might over-
come that presumption. Most restraints previously placed on
bumping are not defensible; bumping is inappropriate only in sen-
iority system cases. This Section also demonstrates that courts can
shield bumped incumbents from the harshest economic conse-
quences of displacement.
101 Courts should be willing to reverse a district court's denial of bumping relief as an
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court has emphasized that even a district court's wide
discretion under § 706(g) is circumscribed by Title VII's command to make the victim
whole. Albemarle Paper, 422 US at 418, 421. Title VII obliges district courts to fashion the
most complete relief possible. When they fail to do so by denying a bumping request, the
appellate court should reverse.
101 Some may dispute the notion that monetary compensation alone cannot make the
victim indifferent between discrimination and nondiscrimination. Whatever the merits of
that view, and leaving aside the feasibility of large awards, Congress's judgment in
§ 706(g)-which provides for reinstatement-is otherwise.
103 Lee, 453 F2d at 1109.
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A. Problems with Current Limitations on Bumping
The decision whether to bump an incumbent to make room
for the Title VII victim, or to force the victim to await rightful
place relief, ultimately hinges on the court's equitable judgment.
Courts often give limited application to bumping based on the fol-
lowing factors: the perceived unfairness to innocent incumbents;
the frequency of openings for the position at stake; the possibility
of workplace antagonism and disruption; and the limited nature of
the employer's acts of discrimination. None of these factors pro-
vides a sound basis for disfavoring bumping.
1. Unfairness to the innocent incumbent.
The equitable case against bumping rests principally on the
fact that the incumbent did not participate in the employer's
wrongdoing. If the incumbent actually helped to participate in the
discrimination by conspiring with the employer, the incumbent's
equitable claim would be negligible. If the incumbent even had
knowledge of the wrongdoing, his equitable reliance interest in the
job diminishes.
Derogating" the incumbent's equitable claim on the ground
that the incumbent was on "inquiry notice" 104 is inappropriate,
however. The practical problems of applying the inquiry-notice
theory are staggering. The mere fact that an employer has discrim-
inated against another in promotion or hiring does not mean that
the incumbent knew or should have known about it. Indeed, given
the consequences, the astute employer will seek to conceal acts of
discrimination. Even if the victim has sued already, to require an
applicant to check court records around the country before ac-
cepting a job (or, more directly, to ask the employer about inci-
dents of discrimination in comparable jobs) seems unworkable.
Courts must confront the fact that bumping will necessarily harm
the interests of one who is usually blameless.10
When balancing this equity interest of the incumbent, courts
should consider that the incumbent's claim arises from a discrimi-
natory act. Although this does not implicate the incumbent di-
rectly, it does change our intuitive judgment about which of the
14 See Walters, 803 F2d at 1150 n 15.
105 The analogy to NLRA bumping relief falters here slightly. The chances are much
greater that the person hired to replace the striker has actual knowledge of the dispute than
does the innocent incumbent in a standard Title VII case. Clark, 38 Cath U L Rev at 816 n
112 (cited in note 30). Even a non-striking union discriminatee likely will have been in-
formed of the discrimination by the union.
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two "deserves" the position. One person, the victim, lays claim to
the job by virtue of her merit: but for an illegal act she would now
hold the position. The other, the incumbent, lays claim to the job
by virtue of being the beneficiary of another's illegal act. The Wal-
ters court offered a helpful conceptualization of the interests at
stake. Refusing to bump the beneficiary of discrimination penalizes
the victim of that same discrimination.106
To help focus the equitable problem, consider a dilemma in-
volving stolen property. One might conclude that the incumbent's
position in bumping cases is rather like that of an unwitting by-
stander who is given the victim's stolen property by a crook. Al-
though we certainly would not blame the bystander for the bur-
glar's act, we would have little trouble requiring him to return the
stolen property to the original owner. And we would have little
trouble dispensing with the bystander's equitable claim to the vic-
tim's property. But, especially against the backdrop of a statutory
presumption, we would want to give the owner her property back.
We would want to place the bystander's loss-if any-on the bur-
glar, not the original owner. 10 7
Advocates of the rightful place doctrine as an alternative to
immediate displacement emphasize the harm and perceived unfair-
ness to the innocent incumbent that bumping may cause. This ar-
gument ignores several key points. First, Title VII focuses funda-
mentally on equitable relief for victims of discrimination, not
protection of incumbents. Second, rightful place relief itself will
cause harm to innocent third parties. Rightful place relief will dis-
advantage future job applicants who will have to wait in line be-
hind the victim when the next vacancy occurs. 08 Third, it is un-
realistic to suppose that remedying past and present
discrimination will be cost-free to members of the groups that ben-
efited from that discrimination. Title VII embodies a legislative
judgment that racism and sexism have burdened nondominant
groups for too long. 09
"' Walters, 803 F2d at 1149. See discussion in text at notes 45-49.
107 In fact, the law of property tracks this conclusion. For example, the universal rule is
that "a sale of [stolen] merchandise, though to a bona fide purchaser for value, does not
divest the person from whom stolen, of title." Schrier v Home Indemnity Co., 273 A2d 248,
250-51 (DC App 1971).
106 Paul J. Spiegelman, Remedies for Victim Group Isolation in the Workplace: Court
Orders, Problem Solving and Affirmative Action in the Post-Stotts Era, 29 Howard L J 191,
237-38 (1986). Bumping combined with rightful place relief for the displaced incumbent (see
text at note 122) will also produce this harm to future job applicants. The point here is only
that rightful place relief is not costless to third parties.
109 See Legislative History-1964 at 2153 (House Judiciary Committee Report) (cited
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Finally, the argument from fairness simplistically treats the
dilemma as a two-dimensional confrontation between the victim
and the incumbent. In reality, the employer stands in the mid-
dle.110 The harm done the incumbent by bumping is a direct result
of the employer's act, not the victim's. The victim is at least as
innocent as the incumbent. Therefore, the incumbent's equitable
claims have most persuasive force against the discriminatory em-
ployer. The displaced worker's equity interests can be vindicated
in a separate cause of action against that employer.",
2. The frequency of openings for the position at stake.
The case for bumping is often thought most compelling when.
the position at stake is unique or extremely rare."2 Certainly the
victim's equitable claim is strongest in such cases, but it is pre-
cisely those cases in which the incumbent's equitable claims are
strongest as well. The bumped incumbent will have just as difficult
a time finding adequate substitute employment as the victim
would. Thus, courts might limit bumping to relatively common po-
sitions. The difficulty with this approach is that the converse of the
above proposition is also true. Where openings are frequent, the
equitable claims of both the victim and the incumbent are dimin-
ished. Insofar as the equitable claims of either person are based on
the relative uniqueness of the job or the infrequency of openings,
the stakes of the victim and the incumbent rise and fall together.
Therefore, one cannot sort out cases appropriate for bumping from
those inappropriate for bumping according to frequency of
availability.
3. Antagonism and workplace disruption.
Opponents of bumping argue that employee displacement will
disturb work relations."' But antagonism in the workplace gener-
ally does not preclude Title VII relief. Hostility is present in all
litigation. If majority group hostility is allowed to justify limiting
in note 3) ("Through the action we take .on this important bill, we in Congress can do much
to conquer the forces of hatred and intolerance which have been unleashed in our land
110 One commentator, in fact, has identified at least six separate perspectives at stake
in discrimination cases. Spiegelman, 29 Howard L J at 234 (cited in note 108).
"I See text at notes 119-28.
21$ See Lander, 888 F2d at 158 (director of unique cyclorama). See also Note, 42 Vand
L Rev at 1465 (cited in note 80).
113 See, for example, Patterson, 535 F2d at 268-69.
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relief available to victims, Title VII's make-whole policy is
slighted. Accordingly, courts routinely award relief despite the po-
tential backlash from the employer and co-workers. 114 Title VII
has less interest in preserving the collegiality of the discriminatory
workplace than it does in eradicating discrimination. In addition,
to the extent that bumping deters the initial discriminatory denial,
these concerns will not arise. The potential existence of workplace
antagonism and disruption should not defeat bumping relief.
4. The limited nature of the employer's acts of
discrimination.
Courts also consider the probativeness of repeated employer
acts of discrimination. 1 5 Such acts elevate the importance of the
court's interest in vindicating its own power to right past wrongs.
They also extinguish whatever sympathy the court might have had
for the employer's hardship.
But courts should not consider-let alone require-multiple
discriminatory acts, recalcitrance, or bad faith prior to entering a
bumping order. The incumbent does not gain a superior claim to
the job by virtue of the fact that the employer engaged in a lone
act of discrimination. Nor can the employer, for its part, claim ref-
uge in a single act-every act of discrimination is prohibited. Title
VII does not vary the relief available to victims according to a scale
of employer mendacity; one act is enough to bring on the full range
of Title VII's remedies.1
6
B. Where Bumping Is Inappropriate
Having established the superior equitable and statutory claim
of the victim to the position, it remains to be seen under what cir-
cumstances a court should decline to bump. The one area in which
114 See, for example, Banks, 788 F2d at 1165; Bethlehem Steel, 446 F2d at 663; In re
Hopkins, 81 Bankr 491, 495 (W D Ark 1987); Sebastian v Texas Dept. of Corrections, 541 F
Supp 970, 976, 978 (S D Tex 1982).
116 See, for example, Walters, 803 F2d at 1149-50; see text at notes 45-49.
114 Another consideration that courts have weighed is whether the employer's discrimi-
nation was intentional. See Lander, 888 F2d at 157. Discrimination, whether intentional or
not, denies victims their jobs; the victim's interest does not vary with the intentional quality
of the illegal act. This suggests that bumping should be available in disparate impact as well
as in disparate treatment cases. However, application of bumping to disparate impact cases,
which frequently involve large numbers of plaintiffs, will introduce complications relating to
class identification and mass disruption. See Barbara L. Schlei and Paul Grossman, Em-
ployment Discrimination Law 1231-32 (ABA, 2d ed 1983). This Comment focuses on dispa-
rate treatment cases.
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denying a bumping remedy might be appropriate is seniority sys-
tem litigation.11 As an initial matter, the powerful arguments sup-
porting displacement apply to the seniority system context. Yet in
these cases, a rightful place remedy might be more consistent with
Title VII and its legislative history."" The doctrine developed as a
means to provide victims with some relief without sacrificing the
Act's prospective character. As such it is defensible, but only as
long as courts cabin the rightful place remedy within the bounda-
ries established by its historic origins.
C. Relief for the Bumped Incumbent
In a profound sense, the displaced incumbent is also a victim
of the employer's discrimination. The fate of the bumped incum-
bent thus also has Title VII significance. Although the incumbent's
interest should not prevent the victim's reinstatement, the incum-
bent should have recourse against the employer."19
By providing relief to the bumped incumbent, a court dimin-
ishes any unfairness to him.20 It also enhances Title VII's deter-
rence policy. The court will oblige the employer not only to employ
the victim, with all the added costs that entails, but to relieve the
bumped incumbent as well. The employer thus will have to sustain
two employees where only one job is available.' 2 '
Using its § 706(g) discretionary power, a court could order the
employer to provide the bumped incumbent with the next availa-
ble comparable vacancy. Until the substitute position is found, the
employer should have to pay the bumped incumbent at his current
" A court will also want to avoid bumping in the presumably rare circumstance in
which the remedy would lead to an employer's financial insolvency. The victim gains little
from being reinstated to a job that does not exist. See Iris Burke and Oscar Chase, Resolv-
ing the Seniority/Minority Layoffs Conflict: An Employer-Targeted Approach, 13 Harv
CR-CL L Rev 81, 111-15 (1978) (arguing for an insolvency exception to a "full payroll"
layoff remedy whereby courts require employers to pay both minorities and nonminorities).
... See text at notes 10-20.
"I A detailed examination of the possible remedies available to a bumped incumbent is
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a general discussion of such remedies under Title
VII, contract, and state law theories, see J. Hoult Verkerke, Compensating Victims of Pref-
erential Employment Discrimination Remedies, 98 Yale L J 1479, 1485-90 (1989).
"' Note, however, that "diminishing" the harm to the incumbent ordinarily will not
completely eliminate it. Just as the victim suffers when excluded from the disputed position,
so too the incumbent will suffer when the court bumps him. A court exercising its Title VII
make-whole power can only minimize the resulting damage.
121 Under rightful place relief, the employer must also support two employees. How-
ever, the analysis in text at notes 92-93 suggests that the costs of this double support will be
higher under a bumping regime than under a rightful place regime.
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rate for any lost wages. 122 Such a post-bumping order would essen-
tially constitute "rightful place" relief for the incumbent.
Because private agreements cannot stand between dis-
criminatees and Title VII relief,'2 ' a court should be prepared to
order the employer to breach any employment contract with the
incumbent. At the same time, the court could order the employer
to pay any damages for breach.124 However, a remedy sounding in
state contract law faces the dual problem of potential federal pre-
emption and the need for a uniform federal remedial system.
125
In most cases, no contract will govern the relationship between
the incumbent and the employer. In these employment-at-will
cases, the displaced incumbent will have relied to his detriment on
employment expectations. Incumbent employees are certainly enti-
tled to presume that the employer will abide by the law. The inno-
cent incumbent may well have lost other opportunities by taking a
position with the discriminating employer. In some states, the in-
cumbent will have a cause of action against the employer for
breach of an implied employment contract. 26
Even if no such state law remedy is available, the bumped in-
cumbent may have an action for damages under Title VII itself.
One commentator has found a statutory basis for equitable relief
for incumbents rooted in the language and history of Title VII.12 7
Even barring that approach, a court could utilize its general equi-
table power to "secure complete justice" and protect the incum-
bent's detrimental reliance. 28
CONCLUSION
The courts' first tentative movements toward bumping are
steps in the right direction. Nevertheless, the constraints placed on
bumping thus far are improper. The rightful place doctrine devel-
oped as a compromise that allowed courts to address the limited
22 Clark, 38 Cath U L Rev at 816 (cited in note 30). This type of incumbent relief has
federal court precedent. McCurdy, 367 F Supp at 752 (school system ordered to offer the
bumped incumbent principal the first available principal's job and to maintain his pay rate).
23 Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 471 F2d at 592 (relief order modifying collective bar-
gaining contract because union and employer may not compromise Title VII rights);
Spiegelman, 29 Howard L J at 244 (cited in note 108) (court's equitable power to order
remedies should not be limited by private agreements made by a wrongdoing employer).
12, See id at 239 n 145.
125 Verkerke, 98 Yale L J at 1489-90 & n 71 (cited in note 119).
11" See Grouse v Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 NW2d 114 (Minn 1981) (awarding reli-
ance damages in employment-at-will case).
117 Verkerke, 98 Yale L J at 1490-96 (cited in note 119).
125 Id at 1496.
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problem of the lingering effects of pre-Act discrimination without
sacrificing the prospective quality of Title VII. In its time, the doc-
trine served its purpose. But courts expanded it beyond its original
boundaries until it became the reigning standard for relief from
discrimination and effectively blocked true make-whole relief for
victims. The rightful place doctrine also diluted the deterrence ef-
fects that the drafters of Title VII hoped to produce.
Reinstatement, even if it requires bumping, accords with the
text, history, and purposes of Title VII. The equitable criteria es-
tablished by Title VII strongly point in the direction of greater use
of bumping. Courts no longer should conceive of the problem as
one that pits the victim of discrimination against the displaced in-
cumbent. Rather, both the victim and the incumbent suffer at the
hands of the discriminating employer. Courts can devise the bump-
ing order so as to minimize harm to innocent third parties. Courts
could, at a minimum, offer bumped incumbents backpay, frontpay,
and the first available vacancy.
The court that fails to order the immediate reinstatement of a
Title VII victim has validated the employer's prohibited choice. No
amount of mitigation available in the court's arsenal of prophylac-
tic and compensatory weaponry-backpay, frontpay, rightful
place-can alter the stark fact that, at the end of the day, the basic
act of discrimination (the sort prompting the statute and the suit,
after all) has been allowed to stand. It is an odd antidiscrimination
regime that punishes, yet hesitates to undo, the bigot's work. The
fact that the discriminatory employer has interposed an innocent
third party between the victim and "the most complete relief pos-
sible" should not prevent a court from fulfilling its statutory and
equitable responsibilities.
